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April 2013 www.sname.org/sname/mt (mt notes) e Risk Continuum continued good enough. High performance has reduced the risk of fail- ure by increasing resiliency. Sensitivity to operations Weick and Sutclie have extensively researched and written on high-reliability organizations. ey have identied ve characteristics that high-reliability organizations have in common: sensitivity to operations; preoccupation with fail- ure; reluctance to simplify; commitment to resilience; and deference to expertise. To get the most out of the technology and operation? which leads to higher performance?there must be a complete and total sensitivity to operations at all levels of the organiza- tion. In other words, everyone knows what can and cannot be done. It informs the team of the true limits at the frontier end of the spectrum; it increases the resiliency at the average end of the spectrum. It does this by removing at least some of the ambiguity and uncertainty in how the equipment and how the operators react in more extreme situations. e sensitivity to operations is most eective when the leaders, designers, build- ers, operators, and customers are all aware of the capabilities and limits. e story of Ernest Shackleton and the escape from the Antarctic is a study in great leadership. Sensitivity to opera- tions played a central role in how Shackleton determined the makeup of who was in the away team, when and how chances were taken, and where to foc us eorts during the icebound siege and escape. e team knew their limitations intimately and formulated their eorts based on what they knew the lim- its to be, rather than optimistic guesses. Many high-performance efforts, particularly at the frontier, have tighter coupling and increased complex- ity compared to average types of eorts. Tighter coupling is characterized by faster reaction times and less buffer- ing within and between systems. Buering is a traditional shock absorber and the reduction or elimination of these shock absorbers decreases resiliency. Increased complexity results when there are more relationships and more compli- cated interactions. is occurs whenever automation is added or increased?which is necessary for operating high-pressure steam plants, maintaining an unmanned machinery space, or having dynamic position station keeping capability. Tighter coupling and increased complexity create more ambiguity, particularly when venturing to the edge or beyond of what has been done before. When working with high performance at the frontier, it is more important than usual to keep both an eye on the total prize as well as the component or subsystem?in other words, dont oversimplify. Tunnel vision cannot be aorded because things are working at or beyond the limits of validated mod- els. Complexity and coupling are typically increased in both cases, making it necessary to conrm the design or opera- tions changes to the beginning, middle and end of the design process and overall campaign rather than the narrow middle where the change is being proposed. Industry codes and minimum requirements should be treated as only one set of minimum constraints when working the realm of high performance. Most codes and regulations are the minimum and are frequently not tested at the lim- its. Many result from bad experience and are incremental in nature. As an example in shipbuilding, William Fairbairn discussed the notion of a ship as a structural beam (the hull girder). Fairbairn argued that the deck and bottom shell both must be capable of handling tension and compression to with- stand wave-induced bending. Lloyds did not have rules in place that addressed this. Fairbairn demonstrated imagina- tion in what could go wrong and why. His frustration was that the industry codes and regulations were missing the discus- sion entirely. Imagination is something that people engaged in high performance often have; they are pushing for something above average. But imagination cannot be dropped when it comes to risk management. Imagination is associated with the preoccupation with failure. ese teams do not rationalize based on odds or chances; they ask How could this fail and what can be done about it?? Titanic sank, in part, because of a lack of imagination in terms of what type of damage it could sustain and its ability to withstand the damage. e risk management needed to achieve the objective of being the rst nuclear-powered submarine was crucial in the success of USS Nautilus . e vessel was a tremendous success: the rst true submarine, the rst nuclear powered submarine, the rst vessel to traverse the North Pole, and the list goes on. e sensitivity to operations from the earliest concept design stages through how the vessel was operated and studied were far in excess of what would make something just good enough. But just good enough was not the objective. A combination of imagination, realism and dedication were indicative of the inherent role risk management can play in high performance. Well turn our attention now to examples both of success and failure in managing risk in vessel design and operation. Americas Cup defender, Ranger Endeavour II was considered to be one of the finest J-class yachts ever built. en there was Ranger and her crew, which functioned on another level. William Starling Burgess and Olin Stephens designed the yacht for Harold Vanderbilts cam- paign to defend the Americas Cup. e crew, led by Vanderbilt and Stephens, demonstrated a remarkable sense of the boats capabilities with a record of 32 wins and 2 losses during the 1937 campaign to defend the cup. In terms of risk and high