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October 2012 www.sname.org/sname/mt (in review) REVIEWED BY ERIK SEITHER John Jordan maps the detailed naval vessel development that occurred during the period following the treaty among Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed in Washington in 1922, and up to the International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed in London in 1930. ese nations were fac- ing dicult economic times during the period following World War I and were looking for a way to limit a predictably expensive race to develop both new and updated naval platforms. e Washington treaty resulted from the desire to pur- sue common interests above individual national interests, about which the par- ticipants were surprisingly direct. e benet of Jordans work is not in assessing the value of the treaty, but in show- ing how the treaty shaped naval developments of the time. Geographically, Italy was focused on the Mediterranean Sea; France on the Mediterranean and her colonies; Japan on the Pacic Ocean; Britain, with its empire around its peak at this time, on its far-ung empire; while the U.S., as the new naval power, needed to project its force globally. Naval developments were driven by the Washington treaty. Jordan details these developments to show how each countrys decisions and experiences aected the others in design, investment, and political positioning, aligning the timeline with specic vessel and weapon developments, bringing important elements such as aircraft carrier devel- opment into focus. is book reminds us of how large the world is and how small these navies were at the time, while exposing the importance of changes in world order. Reading this work highlighted two points for me right away. If you have heard Admiral Eccles speak recently, you will more than likely have heard him emphasize the long life of naval assets, and, indirectly, how much momentum there is in their supporting institutional programs. How long will it take for an all-electric naval vessel, much less a full bat- tle group, to appear in todays world? ere are in fact long cycle times today, and while it may be tempting to think these cycles have accelerated, Moores Law does not apply here. e second observation is that eorts to articially limit developments simply end up transferring development efforts somewhere else. In the case of the Washington treaty, it was mostly to good end. ere was still an arms race enabled by this treaty, though one governed by the practicali- ties of what the governments at the time could invest. In the U.S., the race was focused on specic eorts within these ship types that drove workable developments without the distrac- tion of larger-scale experimental ship design. Looked at in this way, the U.S. probably achieved its goals with the treaty, while it was more of a mixed bag for the other countries. e country-by-country analysis is complex and interesting. Tonnages were xed for destroyers, capital ships, subma- rines, and cruisers, these types being either common at the time or anticipated. Sizes and numbers of guns were agreed, both of which had impact on armoring. Endurance, speed, survivability, and tonnage compromises were forced in ways that aected the more global interests of the United Kingdom and the U.S. dierently from those of Japan, France, and Italy. e U.S. practice of all or nothing? armoring?mean- ing applying armor only to specic compartments?became standard practice among these countries when faced with these competing constraints. Compartmentation, particu- larly for machinery spaces and magazines, evolved as well, with regular reference to German developments. Diesel engine developments; the introduction of welding as a weight saving technique; availability of equipment; shipyard capacity; types of steel and their availability; re control systems; private and public contracting practices; and shipbuilding infra- structure are addressed where they played a part in the outcomes for each navy. Stability issues arose, especially for the Japanese, in their case multiplied by deliberate under estimation of weights and tonnage, and preoccupation with large command spaces. Fuel type and availability were important considerations, leading to advances in the application of technologies including super- heated steam, double-reduction gearing, and turbo-electric drive. is is a book of facts to be sure. But it is readable, cleanly written, well referenced, and oers many illuminating graph- ics and photos. Comparative data are organized by ship type, weapons system, country, speed, tonnage, ship age, and con- struction timeline. ere is inevitable and useful reference to tactics and how they evolved. ere is little human drama here beyond specic commentary on the seakeeping of a number of ship types that hints at life aboard these vessels, though these brief glimpses tend to arouse curiosity. I recommend this book not only for its detail. More fun- damentally, I recommend it for linking the development of marine technologies to world events. MTErik Seither is the executive director of SNAME. Warships After Washington: The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 By John Jordan PUBLISHED BY SEAFORTH PUBLISHING