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April 2012 www.sname.org/sname/mt National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) observer aboard the vessel put it, If the shmaster doesnt want the captain there anymore, the captains not going to be there anymore. So to buck them is to put their job on the line.? Other questions arose about the toler- ance of drugs and alcohol aboard FCOAs vessels. Despite FCOAs zero tolerance pol- icy?a policy unambiguously spelled out in its employee handbook?numerous wit- nesses recalled instances of crew alcohol consumption aboard the Alaska Ranger . Further, in April 2008, an NMFS observer on another vessel, Alaska Spirit , led a safety violation report stating that he smelled mar- ijuana on several occasions while underway. e NTSB therefore determined that some employees did not adhere to prescribed company policy onboard the companys vessels, and that action was not taken either by FCOA or its vessels masters to enforce the zero-tolerance policy. As to the Alaska Ranger itself, a discon- nect existed even among FCOA employees as to whether the vessel had been ice classed, or certified for operation in ice. The FCOA operations manager and the port engineer both testied that the ves- sel had been so classed, citing a reinforced band on the hull as protection against ice. NTSB investigators determined, however, that the vessel had not been ice classed. Drawings in the ships 1973 classication report and in the hull survey done after the vessel was converted for the shing trade show a 1.25-inch thick plate extending 4 feet below the factory deck. As the vessel was originally constructed, that plate was the sheer-strake. After the vessels con- version, when a deck was added, the plate was approximately at the waterline, where ice strengthening plates would ordinarily be tted. us, vessel operators and com- pany personnel could have mistaken the sheer-strake for an ice-strengthening plate. Despite having been regularly operated in ice conditions in the Bering Sea, then, the Alaska Ranger had not been strengthened for such operations, and neither FCOA management nor the vessels crew were aware of this fact. Standardization and discipline Lautman and Gallimore found that stan- dardization and discipline were important elements of a successful safety culture. Although they were looking at airlines, could the same not be applicable here? For example, they noted that the operators in the airline industry were insistent in ensur- ing that standard operating procedures (SOPs) be followed precisely. Empress of the North accident On May 14, 2007, the 300-ft. passenger vessel Empress of the North , operated by Majestic America Line, grounded on a charted rock at According to one witness, the shmaster had actually sped up the vessel through the ice to make better time to port, while the master was not present on the bridge. On May 14, 2007, passenger vessel Empress of the North , operated by Majestic America Line, grounded on a charted rock at the intersection of Lynn Canal and Icy Strait in southeastern Alaska.