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April 2012www.sname.org/sname/mt is placed on board in the expectation that it is of assistance but is not intended to be relied upon, then very high integrity may not be specied; after all; there will be other checks and alternative means available. The problem comes when the assistant? becomes the infallible oracle,? causing the crew to rely on the system and cease using the alternative means as the primary method. e transition from con- ventional navigation to reliance on GPS is one example, and the reader may recall the grounding of the cruise ship, Royal Majesty, o Nantucket when the GPS signal was lost and reversion to dead reckoning went unno- ticed. Another potential cause for concern is the provision of computer model-based advisors for re and evacuation handling on cruise ships, where in the intensity of an emergency it is all too possible that the crew will accept the system recommenda- tion without challenge, which is probably a greater reliance than the designer of the software tool had envisioned. Usability and dependability are both properties of the ship that is delivered to the ship owner. Both require considerable attention during the design and procure- ment process to avoid making the kinds of choices that increase the risk of human error in service and contribute to serious marine incidents. Managing these two properties will have a signicant impact on the robust- ness of the total ship system in reducing the risk of human element related incidents. Awareness of risk is central to man- aging the human element. Caution is a laudable quality. However, an overly cau- tious approach may be taken, which in itself can create situations, which encourage the operator to take an innovative and unin- tended route to circumvent what appear to be overly restrictive constraints. In some areas, governments work on the precau- tionary principle, which places the burden of proof that an action does not involve unacceptable risks of harm onto the person conducting the action. Without scientic evidence, the action is not permitted. Paradigm shift Given the pressure to reduce the level of serious incidents, and with the commer- cial drive to reduce the less serious incidents that result in either insurance claims or direct costs to the operator, the contribution of the human element must be managed. is cannot simply be reduced to the direct management of the seafarers through selec- tion processes and then through company instructions and procedures. Of course, training must be soundly based and rele- vant to the situation involved. e evidence from incident investigations is that serious casualties can result from otherwise entirely normal operational evolutions, for example as the result of fatigue, distraction, or confu- sion. In other cases, faced with an unusual operational condition, possibly following the failure of machinery or equipment, the seafarers take inappropriate action in an attempt to stabilize the situation. We must, of course, wait until the for- mal investigation into the recent loss of the cruise ship Costa Concordia is com- plete to be in possession of the full story. But from the information available so far, it can be concluded that human factors played a major part in this disaster. More lessons could, and should, undoubtedly be learned, but many of the contributory factors will probably be the old ones, oft repeated. It took the catastrophic crash of two Boeing 747 jets at Tenerife in 1977, and the death of nearly 600 people, to change the way the aviation industry looked at cockpit resource management and the interaction between crewmembers. Perhaps the loss of Costa Concordia will lead to similar changes across the maritime industry. Emphasis must be placed on excellent systems engineering practices that involve real users who understand the operational environment, to achieve usable outcomes in which the individual elements are sup- plied against a sound understanding of the way these will be used. Where items will be relied on by the operators, it is imperative that appropriate quality be built in, with thorough testing to prove satisfactory operation under a wide range of conditions. e challenge is to fully understand why some of the apparently inexplicable choices were made by compe- tent and experienced seafarers, resulting in serious casualties and incidents. Most shipowners and operators recog- nize that managing the human element is an important issue. Of course, approaches vary depending on circumstances and particular experience. To reduce further the loss rate of merchant ships and to reduce the number of serious incidents will require a di erent approach to managing the human element, taking note of the broad denition used by the IMO. e human element must become central to the entire lifecycle of the ship- ping operation, from the earliest concept stage when a new project is just beginning to be investigated through design, construc- tion, operation, maintenance, and disposal. By making the appropriate choices at each stage, by providing appropriate training and familiarization, and by thinking about how the vessel will really be used, it is possible to arrive at a situation where the shipping operation is less vulnerable to human ele- ment related incidents. It also is possible that, when the seafarer is called upon to act to mitigate the impact of failures or unusual scenarios, he or she will be provided with clear, unambiguous information for guid- ance to increase the likelihood of containing the impact. MTVaughan Pomeroy is a visiting professor at the University of Southampton and works with the university to facili- tate links between industry and the research community. Distraction from the task at hand is a common reality in most workplaces, although the outcome is usually ineciency rather than tragedy.