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April 2012www.sname.org/sname/mt deployment of less well-proved equipment in ships at sea), and lower safety margins in modern ship designs. Whatever the key inuences might be, the evidence is that the increased cost of failure, particularly related to machinery and electrical sys- tems, is in need of a reversal. It seems unlikely that the marine pro- fessional community will find a purely technological solution that will reduce the incidence of losses and serious damages, although there will be changes that result in improvements. However, the industry must actively work to gain those improvements, and a key element will involve dealing e ec- tively with the human contribution. Included in this area will be the contribution of human activity to safety and reliability; the chal- lenge of reducing human-related losses; and the necessity of addressing the challenge through appropriate management measures to meet the expectations of politicians, soci- ety, and the wider maritime industry. The human contribution e common value assigned to the proportion of serious marine incidents that are the result of human failure is 80%, although there is no conclusive evidence to support this assertion. While the proportion is certainly signicant, the quantication of the human contribu- tion to the totality of serious marine incidents might be problematic. After all, it is a matter of denition and, perhaps more importantly, the willingness to assign responsibility for an incident to the people who were in a position to avert or arrest the chain of events that led to the incident. It is sucient, at this stage, to accept the general belief that the human con- tribution to the totality is highly signicant. Improvement of the safety record is, therefore, dependent on understanding and managing the human element. ere are certain serious incidents that are quite clearly the result of human error, usually by a member or members of the crew. ese include groundings as a result of navigational errors, collisions caused by inadequate watchkeeping, and the conse- quences of over-extended seafarers falling asleep while on watch. ese make up the common denition of human error; that is, a mistake or violation by the person or per- sons directly engaged in the safe operation of the ship. e groundings of the short sea general cargo ships Jambo and Antari in the United Kingdom typify fatigue related inci- dents, while the grounding of the oil tankers Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Sea Empress in Milford Haven, United Kingdom, typify navigational errors. A careful study of the incident reports pro- vides interesting reading. Human activity pervades the whole lifecycle of a ship and it would be unrea- sonable to assume that only crewmembers contribute to serious marine incidents through their actions or inactions. A study of major claims, made by a major mutual insurer, the UK P&I Club, provides insight. SOURCE: LLOYDÂS REGISTER FIGURE 1. ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSSES, 1980 ? 2009, VESSELS GREATER THAN 100 GROSS TONS FIGURE 2. SERIOUS AND TOTAL LOSSES, 1994 -2010, VESSELS GREATER THAN 500 GROSS TONS SOURCE: IUMI FACTS AND FIGURES COMMITTEE