View non-flash version
April 2012 www.sname.org/sname/mt he thinks it is unnecessarily restrictive, or he has deviated from it before with no bad conse- quences. e mariner may become complacent. In 2007, the tanker Axel Spirit struck Ambrose Light at the entrance to New York harbor. e master was conning the vessel, and as the ship approached the light, both the second ocer and the lookout commented that the ship was very close.? e master asked if that meant too close,? and when they answered armatively, the master altered course slightly, but not enough to avoid the accident. e master had been ill before the accident, which may have a ected his per- formance, and the communication among the bridge team was not e ective; but the accident could have been attributed to complacency of both the master and his team. Complacency may stem from boredom, laziness, fatigue, or other factors, but it can lead to carelessness and inat- tention, and it is characteristic of not recognizing or acknowledging risks. Aboard ship, where activities may involve sev- eral people or a team and where there may be procedures to follow, the e ectiveness of the team may be compromised because the team defers to the authority of one individual. This power distance? can be inuenced by culture or other fac- tors, but it also can be amplied by a particularly assertive individual in authority who discourages any viewpoints other than his own. It does not take a Captain Bligh or Lieutenant Commander Queeg to make this happen. Some people call it arro- gance. It is characteristic of believing an accident will not happen, even when the risks are apparent. E orts to understand human factors in the maritime industry and actions to incorporate human performance in ship design and operation have made progress in the last quarter century. e original concept of qualications and train- ing constitute the foundation, and it has been built on by technical and management approaches to controlling human error. Many challenges still lie ahead to minimize human error at sea, but by learning from mistakes and things that go wrong, and by pursuing a safety oriented culture, human performance can be better integrated into a safer marine system. MTDr. Jack Spencer is former director, marine section of the National Transportation Safety Board.