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advising policymakers, regulation devel- opers, or operational program managers on trends, best practices, leading indica- tors, problematic issues, or other concerns regarding vessels and operations on the OCS. NCOE employees have substantial experience in OCS vessel and facility oper- ations and significant understanding of the oshore maritime industry by virtue of memberships in commercial occupational and technical arenas. They each possess licenses, advanced degrees, or experience? either through work in the commercial sector or coast guard marine inspections and investigations, or both. e NCOE enhances both capacity and capability of coast guard marine inspec- tors for OCS vessels, including MODUs. In addition, since the DWH incident, marine inspectors have targeted the highest risk and most critical systems for enhanced examination, including ensuring MODU crews are procient in emergency opera- tions such as failure of dynamic positioning systems, emergency disconnect, reght- ing, and operation of lifesaving systems. þÿ TThe way ahead Personnel casualty statistics for the years 2005 to 2011 indicated that MODUs have a slightly lower personnel casualty rate than other types of vessels regulated by the coast guard. However, given the catastrophic personal, environmental, and economic con- sequences of an incident like DWH, and the likely increase in future drilling on the U.S. OCS, including in the U.S. Arctic, it is prudent to remain vigilant and to continue to enhance both standards and oversight for MODUs. Because MODUs pose a risk of very high consequence incidents, and because most MODUs operating in the deepwater OCS are foreign ag, the coast guard is evaluating an enhanced oversight regime in addition to the risk-based targeting outlined here. To this end, the coast guard will identify the MODU systems that present the greatest risk (or risk reduction value) to safety and environmental stewardship, and are therefore the best can- didates for increased oversight during design, construction, and operations. e goal of this eort is to optimize the procedures and fre- quency for oversight, including plan review, construction inspections, initial certication, and in-service examinations. Foreign-flag cruise ships operating in U.S. ports present a similar prole in terms of the potential for very high consequence incidents (although very low frequency), and are subject to an enhanced oversight regime that may well serve as a model for MODUs in the future. In addition, the coast guard will exam- ine the role of safety management system failures as factors in marine casualties in consultation with appropriate profes- sional organizations such as the National Research Council, the Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, and the Marine Board. þÿ M TMTCaptain Paul Thomas is deputy director of prevention policy with the United States Coast Guard. The drillship Discoverer Enterprise prepares for a coast guard followup inspection aimed at clearing up prior deciencies. January 2012 www.sname.org/sname/mt A Coast Guard Perspective continued (policy brieng) 01_25_FDept_SNAME_Jan12_P4.indd 1012/22/11 3:36 PM