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July 2011 www.sname.org/sname/mt REVIEWED BY ROBERT O. DULIN, JR. The cryptic 32 in 44? in the title of this book refers to the remark- able achievement of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, in Portsmouth, Maine, in com- pleting 32 fleet submarines for the U.S. Navy in 1944. The Portsmouth Navy Yard was uniquely positioned to respond to the wartime demands for the timely completion of relatively large numbers of submarines. In the decades preceding the outbreak of war, the navy had deliberately assigned to Portsmouth the role of lead design agent for submarine construction, in addition to the construction of most of the few new submarines authorized during the Depression years. is expertise and experience stood the yard and the navy in good stead in the years that followed. Before the war, Portsmouth had completed on aver- age fewer than two submarines per year. During the ve years following July 1940, a total of 79 submarines were delivered, an impressive 8-fold increase, capped by the delivery of 32 eet boats during 1944. is enormous improvement in productivity was facilitated by substan- tial capital investment in enhanced shipyard facilities, coupled with a ten-fold increase in manpower, which was partially oset by the loss of much skilled man- power to the draft. U.S. naval funds appropriations for construction, repair, and engineering increased by approximately 40% per year in 1939 and 1940 as the United States prepared for the war. In 1941, the increase was 172%, and in 1942, 554%. Dynamic, experienced military and civilian leadership, combined with a highly motivated and dedicated shipyard organization, contributed to Portsmouths ability to respond to the demand for more and more submarines. e loss of experienced personnel was oset by the establish- ment of dedicated production teams specializing in discrete tasks that could be taught in a relatively short time. e navys decision to concentrate Portsmouths eorts on new construction of submarines helped the yard attain remarkable levels of eciency and quality. Most navy yards were bueted by changes in priority and direction, and ship repair and overhaul require- ments competed with the demands unique to new construction. Interestingly, despite the conscious decision of Portsmouths leadership that cost could be disregarded if a loss of time could be avoided, the direct labor eort per submarine built was halved during the course of the war. In spring 1942, U.S. shipyards were completing submarines in about one year. By the summer of 1944, Portsmouth was routinely completing submarines in six months or less, and costs had also been approxi- mately halved. Despite the emphasis on volume and speed of con- struction, Portsmouth Navy Yard submarines enjoyed a reputation for ruggedness and quality of construction. In December 1944, when the submarine Redsh had been damaged by depth charges after she had torpe- doed and sunk the Japanese carrier Unryu, the captain of the submarine said to his crew, You can thank God that you are in a Portsmouth boat,? attesting to the Portsmouth Navy Yards well-earned reputation for quality submarines. The author of this book b rilliantly evokes the between-the-war era and the frantic wartime years. He conclusively demonstrates the superiority of Portsmouth to other U.S. submarine yards in terms of productivity, speed of construction, and quality of pro- duction. A brief comparison with comparable German submarine construction eorts would have been wel- come by way of contrast. Nevertheless, this book is eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of Rodney Wattersons meticulous research and clear writing. He has provided extensive, detailed footnotes and a num- ber of helpful tables and gures. This book should be read by anyone trying to understand the remarkable achievements of U.S. industry in building the massive arsenal of democ- racy? of World War II. MTBob Dulin, a retired USN engineering duty ocer, is secretary and co-founder of the SNAME Marine Forensics Committee. 32 in 44: Building the Portsmouth Submarine Fleet in World War II By Rodney K. Watterson PUBLISHED BY NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS CLARIFICATION: In the review of Underwater Robotics in the April (mt) , it was stated that the Oce of Naval Research (ONR) supports the Marine Advanced Technology Education Center (MATE). To clarify, ONR does not fund the MATE center. MATE is funded by the National Science Foundation.